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POPULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH*
Everett E. Hagen
I suspect that the disagreement that occasionally arises among
economists or between economists and demographers concerning popu-
lation growth theory and "the populatior problem" has two causes.
One is failure of communication, resulting from unclear statement of
assumptions. The other is the persistence in our minds of Malthusian
conclusions, even though we have forgotten the assumptions on which
they are based.
It should be possible to eliminate the sources of disagreement.
In this paper I distinguish three cases of population growth which
encompass major aspects of the world's population experience; present
an analytical model that seems consistent with all three; and compare
its relevance to reality with that of the Malthusian model, Section I
*1 am indebted to Harold J. Barnett, Ansley J, Coale, R. S.
Eckaus, B. H. Higgins, L. Lefeber, P. A. Samuelson, J. J. Spengler,
E, Sohmen, and Trevor Swan for helpful coments. Since some of them
hold hypotheses or lay stresses at variance with mine, the usual dis-
claimer is especially pertinent.
1. I do not deal with questions of optimum population size or
with factor proportions in a static setting, or with questions of
cyclical change in population growth rates.
1
2distinguishes the three cases. Section II disaundes relevant histors.
ical data, and Section III presents the basic model. Section IT and
an algebraic appendix elaborate it to make it applicable to post*?orld
War II experience. S3ection V contrasts it with the Malthusian model.
I. T!REE CASES OF POPUTATION INCREASE
First consider population growth in low income (peasant) socie.
ties. In such societies, crude birth rates are virtually everywhere
above forty per thousand. Although higher birth rates are biologis
cally possible, this in close to the practical mardmm. Historically,
death rates have been almost as high. Where population growth occurs
in such societies, it occurs because death rates fall. Two causes of
falling death rates may be distinguished fairly sharply.
One is the introduction of modern public health measures and
other preventive medial measures, I shall term the resulting fall in
death rates exogenous. The fall in death rates is followed only after
a lag of undetermincl but considerable length by a fall in birth rates.
In the interval population increases, or, if it was increasing
2. In Westarn Europe, before the Industrial Revolution, late
marriages were common and crude birth rates wore only about 35 per
thousand. This difference may have predictive significance. I dis-
cuss it briefly below, note 32, page 28.
3previously, the rate of population growth rises.
The second cause is a rise in per oapita income.3 Historically,
there have been two major causes of rise in g g income, the
opening up of new territories and technological progress. The former
merely enlarges the scale of the eoonomy, and pormits it to. support
more persons, without directly affecting per capita income.4 Tech-
nological progress, however, in the general case directly increases
per capita inco"e. People live more healthfully, the death rate falls,
and population grows or the rate of population growth increases. It
it increases until it equals the rate of growth in aggregate income,
per capita income of course ceases to rise.
Life expectancy in Western societies is consistent with a death
rate of fourteen or fifteen per thousand even with a stabilised age
distribution of the population; and crude death rates of four or five
per thousand are possible with population concentrated in the lower
3. Of course the availability of nublic health and other pre-'
ventive measures constitutes a rise in income. The reference here is
to a rise in general purchasing power.
4. The filling of "empty lands" was conspicuous in Western Eur--
ope during the Middle Ages and more recently in the history of the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and, after 1650,
with the introduction of new crops, in China. In all of the recent
cases except China, continuing technological progress was of course
oceurring at the same time. Even where there is no rogress in known
technology, there may of course be economies of scale which increase
productivity. I shall not discuss their relation to population. The
reader will be able to apply the argument of Section III.
4'
age groups, as is true for some time after death rates decline. With
birth rates between 40 and 45 per thousand, a decline An death rates
to Western 'levels could bring population growth at the rate of 35
per thousand, or 3.5 percent, per year. This maianu-: t iace rate
of population increase is of importance for population theory.
Distinguishing between population growth due to exogenous and to
income-induced declines in death rates is analytically important.
While the first is obviously a problem of great practical concern, I
shall assert that the second has in the past been of no realistic I.-
portaamv. This is true in the sense that income-induced population
grouth has nowhere prevented even a moderate rate of rise in the ag-
gregate income of an economy from bringing continuing rise in per
capita income. This is no coincidence. A reasonable interpretation
of histiry suggests a mechanism at work which guaranteed that it would
not do so. The relevant fumctions are changing, and whether the same
guarantee will hold good in the future is a oomplex question. I dis--
ouss it in Section III.
5. Birth rates of 50 or 55 per thousand are biologically pos-
sible, and have prevailed in limited areas for periods of moderate
length. Thus a rate of population growth much higher than 3.5 percent
per year is conceivable. However, this rate may be taken as a prao-
tical maximum.
6. Of course income-induced population growth may prevent the
rise in per capita income from being as fast as it otherwise would be.
The recent spurt in population grwth in the West constitutes the
third case I shall discuss. Since World War II, population growth has
accelerated in the United States and Western Europe because of a now
phenomenon, a rise in birth rates. Zn the United States and at least
some Western luropean countries, this rise is not simply the conoen-
tration in the postwar period of births postponed from depression and
war, for it is characterised by the/creation of a far larger numbe
of third and fourth children than was previously customary. Further,
in some countries it is still continuing. This case of population
growth stands at one side of the historical trends that alarmed
Malthus and many subsequent analysts. I shall discuss it only to the
extent of suggesting possible alternative causes, and asking whether
any of them is inconsistent with my basic model.
II. HISTORICAL POPUItTIONT (ROF.l{: THE DATA
The historical distinction between exogenous and induced popm-
lation growth is fairly clear. Exogenous declines in death rates have
attracted attention mainly since World War II. Through technical
assistance from abroad, death rates in a considerable number of
peasant countries have fallen drastically, most abruptly of all in
Ceylon. Birth rates have remained high, and as a result in recent
years population growth has been approximately three percent per year,
6or more, in Ceylon,. Malaya, Mexico, Venesuela, Souador, and several
Central American countries and Caribbean areas, and Well above two
percent in a number of other countries. Because of the receney of
minimm
the declines in death rates, the/Length of the lag before birth rates
7fall is unknown, except that it is probably more than a decade. In
the historical cases of less spectacular fall in death rates, the lag
has been as Zong as several generations. If it should now be a genera-
tiop or longer, the effect on living levels in lowmincome countries
where rapid technological progress is not occurring may be oatastrophic.
It is not so widely observed that the slower but increased rate
of population growth in a number of peasant countries over a longer
period has been due to the same mechanism. From the beginning of the
Christian era to 1650, the average rate of growth of world population
was in the neighborhood of 1/20 of one percent per year. It then
began to rise, first in Western Europe, but during the last half of
in
the nineteenth century/the peasant societies, bioh were then colonial,
The modal rate in peasant societies between 1900 and World War II was
probably between .5 and one percent per year. While precise data are
7. The crude death rate in Ceylon, as recorded in the United
Nations D g phic: earbook fell from 19.8 in 1946 to 16.0 in 1947,
and cont us aun to ORten in 1956. The crude birth rate, which
remained between 38.4 and 39.8 from 1946 to 1953, fell from 38:7 in
1953 to 35.7 in 1954, giving possible hope of a spectacularly short
lag. But in 1955 it was 37.3 and in 1956 36.14, thus quenching the
hope of a quick downward trend. Age-specific birth and death rates
for these recent years are not available.
7of course not available, historical evidence indicates rather clearly
that the level of per capita ince in such societies had not risen
before the rise in the population growth rate. There is also histori-
al evidence that the increased rate of population growth has resulted
specifically from gradual introduction of improved medical and health
practices under colonial administrations. ea o obse r
point to this popvlation rise in peasant societies as evidence that a
rise in per capita income may be aswamped by population growth, it is
worth while to assert specifically that the rise in aggregate income
in peasant soeieties witbin the century before World War I was pro-
dominately a resut, nO a cause, of population growth. The forces
at work in tese areas tending to increase the income of the mass of
the population were extremely weak. Colonial administrations did not
induce continuing technological progress in the areas they controlled.
Contiruing technological progress begins when an adequate base of
scientific-technical knowledge is available (a condition now every-
where fulfilled), and when socio-psychological changes have oceured
such that a sufficient number of the individuals of the society devote
their enerTIes to problems of technological innovation. lArtain eon-
8. I China, by way of exception, population groawth presumably
resulted primrily from introduction from abroad of the sweet potato,
peanuts, and early-ripening rice, which permitted the settling of large
land are-As that would not previously support population.
8ditions of capital supply are also necessary they my be independent
oonditioms or may follow if the sociompsychological conditions exist.9
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these conditions cam
to exist in twenty-scm countries of the world. Continuing technom
logical paogress began, and brought (an accelerated rate of) increase
in agr bte output. As this increase got under way, per _capita
Income steadily rose. The death rate gradually declined. The rise in
income permitted maintenance of larger and larger families, If desired,
If the simple Malthusian model o f population behavior1  is realistic,
in each of these coumtries, as per capita income rose, at some point
population growth should have reached a rate equal to the rate of
growth in aggregate output, thus cheokdng the rise In per capita in-
come. Or, alternatively, if the rate of rise in aggregate output was
so fast that it exceeded the realistic maximm biological rate of
population growth--say 3.5 percent per year-.population growth should
9. Saen economists believe that it begins when certain economic
barriers, bottlenecks, or vicious circles are broken, and ignore the
social and psychological factors. This difference of opinion concern-
Ing the causal factors is not Important for the present purpose, but
it is important to note that technological progress, not merely capital
formation, Is In point.
The hypothesis that socio-psychological changes are of central
importanoe does not rule out the necessity of political change. This
may in some oases be necessary in order that the new groups can be
ree to act.
10. 1 use the term "simple Malthusian model" loosely here, For
a statement of the essential elements of the Malthusian model, see
Section V.
11. See note 5, above.
9have reached that rate. The historical facts of income and popula-
tion growth will test the thesis.
I shall examine the facts only in countries in which a moderate or
rapid rate of rise in aggregate output (1.5 percent per year or morse) 2
began before the end of the nineteenth century, since ere it began
only in the tWentieth century it is possible that poputation growth
has not yet reached its peak. There are seventeen such countries, and
only seventeen. Nowhere else in the vwrld could populltion growth
have checked rise in per capita income, because nowhere else (before
1900) did an accelerated rate of increase in aggregate output occur.
Professor Kumnets in a recent compilation presents dati. concerning
growth of output and population for thirteen of these 0eventeen.O
12. I include Ireland even though its rate of inmrease in output
was slightly lower.
13. Obviously, population increase could not have prevented a
rapid rise in aggregate output; it is favorable.
14. Simon Kusnets, uantitative Aspects of the Eoctnic Growth
OfNtos I oeA Vaiblt of Rtsof Grouti,, being
Change. For the United Kingdom aM States, ti7-rod
covered by Kusnets' data may not be the periods of most rapid growth
in output* Iiore rapid growth may have occurred earlier, i.e. before
186o.
10
Table 1 presents the data. While data for the growth of output in
the nineteenth century are not available for the other four eountries,
it is clear from general historical comments about those countries
that the course of events in them paralleled that in the other thirteen.
In each country, the death rate fell as nutrition, health care, etc.
improved. The rate of population growth would have approached the
biological maximum if birth rates had simply remained at their pre-
vious level as income rose. What happened?
1. In no country except the United States and Canada-here vast
empty lands cried out to be filled--did rise in income stimulate popu-p
lation growth remotely approaching that which Malthusian theory Indi-
cates rising income should induce. In no case except those of "empty
lands" did the rate of population growth exceed 17.5 percent per de-
cade even for a single decade.. 6 The median peak decade rate among
the thirteen countries is 12.5 percent. Over the fifty years of fast-
est growth, the median is much lower.
15. Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and New Zealand. For all
but Belgium Kusnets presents data for the twentieth century.
In the twentieth century, rapid growth began in a number of other
countries, for example, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Mexico, Brasil, Colombia,
and perhaps aln Hungary, Turkey, Argentina, and Chile. Soe other
Latin American ;buntries, and possibly one or two elsewhere, might be
added.
16. In Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada,
during an early pre-industrial period of filling empty lands, popu-
lation growth reached higher rates than those shown in Table 1, but
this growth is not relevant to the prosent argument.
UTable 1
Average Percentge Change per Decade, Popula tion and Nationef Product,
Constant Prices Thirteen Developing Countries, Two Periods,' and MaxImum
Decade Percent"ge Change in Population.
(2)
f-erioda
1886/9015/5L
Canada &)1870/79A1950/5L4
bA870/79-1905/14
Dennark a )1870/78-1950/54
b)1870/78-19014A3
France a )1841/50-1949/53
b)1841/50-1901/10
Germany a)1.860/69-1950/54,
b)1860/69-1905A14
Ireland- a)1860/69-199/53
Eire b)1860/69-1904/13
Italy a)1862/68-1950/5
b)1862/68-190 4/13
Japan a)1878/87-1950/h1
b)1878/87-1903/12
Sweden a)1861/68-1950/54
b)1861/68-1904/13
(3) (4) (5) (6)
ercentage Chame per Decade Decate- of Highest dP/ -
National
Product
26
1.3
47.1
30.1
32.7
15.
18.6
27.14
35.6
12.8
11.6
18.0
15.7
42.3
149.2
036.o
Population
(1)
country
Australia
Approximate
Datea
1899-1909
1913-1923
1855-1865
1894-190L4
1938-1948
1923-1933
1937-1947
1938-19L8
Switzer-
land
Percentage
Change
30.2
17.5
4.7
15.2
0.0
8.0
114.7
12.5
10 .5c
Rubssia- a)1870 1954
U.S.S.R b)1870- 1913
United a)186/69-1949/53
Kingdom b)1860/69-1905/14
United a)1860/69-1949/53
States b)1860/69-1905,/14
31.0
27.7
21.5
25.0
21.5
25.0,
13044
15.7
8.0
8,0
U.1
1869-1879
1873-1883
17 b
18.3
17.8
n.5
1.3
1.9
.5149U,5
-3.5
-5.4
6.9
7.0
12.7
6.6
12.4
24.7
56uire 1T , ali~Tis 6 lasis-OTeel$ 1Oc 1 . i penE iix s ' -a7 ,ee
13-15, 17-181 cole 2-, ibid, TbE 6, except Australia and strna
which were computed fromTpndix Tablea 18 rAd 5, repectivey.
(For notes, see next page.)
__ ,
a)1890/99-1939/18
32
Table 1 (continued)
a. Generally, Kusnets presents data for overlapping dscades. His
population data are shown as for intervals from one overlapping decade
to another. The dates given in col. 5 are the fifth years of the do.
cadembe cites,
b. The docade rate from the first to the last period covered. Other
percentages in these column are trend line rates.
a. The decade rate for the 20-year period.
d. The decade rate for the 16wyear period.
2. In no country did the rate of population growth approach
the rate of growth in aggregate output. In fact, in none exept the
United States did the - rate of population growth for a single de-
cad. approach the zmg rate of growth in output for the entire
fifty- to one hunded-year period overed.
3. In England, there is evidence concerning the rate of change
in aggregate income during the century before the period of most rapid
growth. The evidence indicates that rise in aggregate income bei.
gan slowly, then accelerated only gradually. Various studies give
conflicting evidence about the timing of rise In output within the
eighteenth century, but all indicate that over the century as a whole,
output rose. Phyllis Deane's estiinates indicate an average rate of
growth for the century (which she thinks was concentrated in the first
half of the century) of about 15 percent per decade. Population growth
13
failed to keep pace even with this:moderate rate; it rose by about six
pe r cent per decade. 1 7 Population grouth did not match that in
ootput even during an early period of a slow rate of growth from a
low level of income.
The evidence thus indicates not merely that the expected "Halthusian
result did not ooour pnera*ly, but that it did not ocour anywvhere. In-n
stead, birth rates followed death rates dowmard long before a maximus
rate of population increase had been reached, and both continuid down-.
18ward until they reached secular minima,
These facts raise the important question whether technological
progress is apt to bring such favorable results herever it begins in
the future. The uniformity of the past result suggests that there was
a mechanism at work which necessarily caused it. In order to knou
whether we may aopropriately extrapolate in tim, it is worth bile to
inquire what that mechanism may have been.
17. See two articles by Phyllis Deane in Eoonomic Deelo and
Culturl Changes "The Implications of Early Nional Income ates
gor Ih Measurement of Long-Term Economic Growth in the United Kingdom,'
17 (Noveiiber 195$), 3-38, and "The Industrial Revaiution and Econoude
Growths The hvidence of arly British National Income Estimates,' V(January L957), 159-174, Concerning other estimates of income or pro-
duction, see T. S. Ashton, An oonomio History of lands The eenth
! (Barnes and Noble, O or, 55, and sources 0ited by
18. See the sources cited by Kntes, lo. cit.; or for a general
description of the trend see any standard degrphia discussion, such
as R. R. Kuosynski, The Balance of Births and Deaths, 2 vols., New
York, The HacMillan Go., 192L-1931.
l1I
II. AN AaL!TICEt )E
Figure 1 portrays the relevant model. Aggregate income is in-
dicated by I, population by P, and a dotted symbol represents a first
derivative with respect to time. Thus Y is the absolute increment in
aggregate income per time period, -and 1/! in the percentage, i.e.,
proportional, change per time period. Income per eapita (T/P, or y)
is shown on the horisontal axis, and rates Ti and P/P (abstract numi..
19bers) on the vertical. For convenience, T/! is referred to as .v,
and P/P as r.
%IL
I
ma 00 o
Figure 1. The Simpe * althusian" Model
The axes and P/P or r cur are thos of Figure 3a In
R. R. Nelson, "A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium Trap in Under-
developed Countries" American Esonomic Review, XLVI (December 1956),
is
Full eployment is assumed, and for simplicity the level of
employman6 is assumed to bear a constant ratio to population. Output
is a function of capital and labor inputs only. "Land" wifl be introso
duced later. A conventional production function and constant returns
20
to scale are asiu4. Each /Y or v function reflects a constant
state of the arts. Novement along a v function from a ler to a
higher y results solely from an increase in the ratio of capital
inputs (C) to labor inputs (P). An upward shift of the function rem
suits from technological progress or an upward shift in the function
relating saving (S) to income or both.
The f/P or r curve is assumed to rise with rising y until it
reaches a maximum set by biological limitations (the practical mai mm
rather than the highest conceivable level), after which it rerdains
horisontal. The shape of the v curve depends on the operation of the
law of variable proportions (in relation to. variations in the C/P
ratio), the rate of saving at different per capita income levels, the
rate of population growth at different per capita income levels, and
89l4*988 which seems to me the sharpest delineation in print of the
Malthusian model. For two other articles that use the graohic
device of rates on one axis to deal elegantly with problems of economic
growth, see R. N. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic
Groth," quarteriv Journal of Economics, LXI (February, 1956), 65-96j,
and Trevar wan, "Economic Growth and Capital Formation," Economic
Record. November 19$6, 33I..61.
20. A different assumption concerning returns to scale slightly
complicates the statement of the argument without affecting the
conclusions.
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retns to seale (here assumed constant). The specific shape assmed
does not affect the argument here, so long as the ove intersects the
r curve from above, as in Figue . It must intersect thus to re-
flect the 4althuuian assumption of a tendency for population increase
to check the rise in per capita income. At any intersectian of the
two curves y is constant, since v r. If the v curve intersects from
21. The more steeply the curve rises in the area to the right of
its intersection with the r curve, the less the upward shift necessary
for it to arch above the r curve, elminating the lqw-incom6.level
intersection (intersecting far to the right as the v ourve turns down
again), and thus escaping the Nalthusian low-incomelevelmequilibrimu
trap. Similarly, if the v curve arches upward sufficiently, at the
right of its intersection with the r aurve, it may intersect the r
curve from below, creating an unstable quilibrium that will psrmit
escape from the lo-levelequilihiuum trap it some force pushes te
system up beyond the point of unstable eqnili n. (See R. t. Nelson,
2oo. cit.) Since the empirical evidence indicates that the low-level
FIWiSOrAs not esoped 'in either of these ways, we are interested
here only ii 9-0a In the vicinity of the loa-level equilibrium; hente
the precise shape of the curve is not important.
The v curve has fairly complicated deteri ants. For considera-
tion of the two factor case, substitution of a curve ( / sy/k,
where s -the ratio of saving to income) permits a more elegant di.-
ou2sion, but use of this curve becomes umanageable when land is intro-
duced into the argument.
It should be noted that each v curve is a longtrum curve; i.e.,
each assumes the prevalence throughout all income levels of the /!f
rate and the level of techniques associated with that curve. hovement
from cne curve to a higher one because of an increase in the S/r rate
will nitially overshoot the higher curve and then asymptotically drop
down to it. The initial path of movement following such a shift may
be concave upward over an interval during which the v curve itself is
concave downward. While the shape of the time path, resulting from
the timing of the upward shift, will affect the path of movement of
the system over time, and therefore the level of aggregate income and
population at any given moment in time, it will not materially affect
the argment.
17
above, as at y1 , at any point to the left of the intersection v > r,
thus raising y, vhile at any point to the right v ( r, thus lowering y.
I.., at yy there is a stable equilibrium in y. If by a fortunate
accident, or a luqp contribution of capital from outside the system,
y were raised above y , increase in population at a higher rate thanin
aggregate income would foros it down again. This is the "althusian
income trap"2 2
It is assumed that sero sving and sero population growth ooeur
at the same value of y. This assumption, which is not in the least
necessary, satisfies the simplest form of the H4althusian notion of a
subsistence level of income. In Figure 1, let this point be y .
Suppose now that through some exogenous force the v function
shifts upward. In this twoofactor model, v and r will reach a new
stable equilibrium,as at Y2* Population, capital, and aggregate in-
come will increase indefinitely at a constant proportional rate,
while y remains constant at an increased level. If the intersection
is in the horisontal section of tho v curve, as at y3, then capital,
population and aggregate income race upward at equal ratesa and one
equal also to the biological madimm possible rate of population in-
crease. The rapid increase in population (labor inputs) causes no
tendency for y to decline, since labor force increase runs into no
22. The phrase "Nalthusian trap" is Nelson's 1oc. cit.
18
scarce cooperant factor.
Suppose, however, that we assume the existence of a third factor,
land, which is augmentable only at increasing cost per unit (or, if
you choose, is available in absolutely limited supply). Then the
value of v at any given level of y will dpend not only on the level
of techniques and the rate of saving, but also on the quantity of
capital and labor. As C and P increase, the prodactivity at the margin
of increments of capital and Labor (for convenience think of a combined
unit of capital and labor) will dnd h after a point, and after a
further point v will fall. This fall in v without change in the ratio
of C to P constitutes a douraard shift in the v function. 2 3 This
downward shift, inevitable in the absence of a renewed force tending
to push the function upward, will continue until y has returned to
the subsistence level.
Above some level of y, there may be a "standard-of-iving" effect
on birth rates. In Figure 1, let y be this point. Then if the v
curve shifts upward to the position v , intersecting the r curve to
the right of yn, as at y4, the effect of aperiencing this level of
living will be to shift the r curve downward to the position ro, and
continued capital formation even without technical advance will cause
y to rise to y5. However, y will thereafter doeline, if the limitation
23. And is to be contrasted with movement along the curve be-
cause of change in the C/P ratio.
on land supply continues to exert its influenoe, since that limita-
tion will pres the v enrew steadily douvard and thus move Y steadily
to the left.
I have referred to the decline in birth rates as due to a "standard-
of-living" effect. However, I use thi term In a broad sense. It
should not be assumed that the direct operating force in necessarily
the increase in per capita ineome. The rise in per capita income is
accompanied by a shift in the occupational composition of the labow
force, urbanisation, and a decline In death rates. Somewhere within
this complex is the force that produces the "standardwoliving" et-
footI what component of the complex directly exercises the influence
on birth rates need not be eaamined at this point.
Historically, in no case as per caoita income rose did the rate
of population growth reach (or approach) the practical biological
marmn, as the model requires, and in no ease has per capita incoms
turned downward secularly. We are looking for a mechonism that will
explain these two phenomena.. One is found in the assumption of con--
tinuing technological progresa, combined with certain plausible as
sumptions about the operation of the model.
Note first that any single improvement in technology shifts the
V curve upward, for it increases the output of a combination of espi+
tal and labor inputs in the production of some prodw*%, and thereby
increases both the increment of aggregate output eaeh time that
20
product (or an adaptation of it involving in some degree the same
method) Is produced, and the Wikelhood that that product will be
chosen for produotion (its unit cost being reduced). Since this is 
the effect of a single improvement in technology, continuing techno-
logical progress tends to push the v function continually upward.
But, as sketched above, at any level of income above subsistence
dminiiMng returns to capital and Icbor with respect to land exerts
downward pressure on the Y function. This downward pressure counters
in some degree the tendency to continual rise of the function. For-
ther, this downward pressure increases over time, since canital and
labor increase in quantity over time. (The higher the level of the v
function, the more rapidly the downward pressure increases, since C and
L are increasing more rap idly.) Continuing technological progress
will therefore push the v functicnupward for a time, but eventually
(with any given pace of technological progress) the rise will grad-
ally be halted and then gradually reversed, thus also gradually cheek#-
ing and then reversing a rise in y. For a time, the position of the
v curve will be virtually constant.
The simple asswption of lend egmentability only at increasing
cost is not realistic. The model is more relevant to reality if in.
stead it is assumed that technological progress increases the nuantity
of land, making the upward or downward drift of the v function a
matter of the specific parameters employed. However, it may be wall
*4*
20s
to carry through the aalysiS on the assuaption of land augmentable
only at increasing Cost,- since this is Malthusf assumption.
LOt us now Nlm the further assumption that a "standard-of-living
effect" occurs at anY level of Incoms above the subsistence level if
inoces is sustained above subsistence for a inim=w period (say the
period from early infancy to parenthood). There is no reason in
logic to assume any specific floor of per capita income, below which
the standard-of-living effect does not occur. It follws that tech-
nological progress at any rate whatever will cause a standard-of-living
021
effect, unless land stringency is so great and technological progress
so light that the system rises from and then returns to the subsism
tenes 10l of y within a few years. With a faste@ rate of techno-
logical progress, holding the (v function above subsistence for a
sufficient time, there wil follow a deoline af death and birth rates
until both reach minima, after which a rise in per capita incom
may continue.
The process is illustrated in Figure 2. Let us assue for
"U
Figure 2: The Standardhof-Living Effect at a LowMIncome Level
graphical simplicity that the v function rises to its position 2 and
.
a
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hovers at that level. The upward shift causes a rise in y and r along
the r, function to its intersection b with the v function. The rise
in r was of course via a fall in death rates. But at the higher level
of y, after a Lag birth rates 4il fall (the standard.af-living effect).
The resulting fall in the rate of population increase constitutes a
fall in the r function, as to position r2o r falls from b to a. Since
r is now less than v, y and r again rise, this time along the 2 arve
to its intersection d with the v2 curve. A further standard-of-living
effect occurs, and the process is repeated, r moving from d to e to f
to g to h.h Here the process stops, if we assume that in position 4
of the r function death rates and birth rates are at their minima, and
that at their minima r is sero or positive. The determinants of a death
rate miramuaprimarily the state of medical and health practices, in
peaceful times--need no discussion. The determinants of a birth rate
minimum are less clear. They are discussed shortly. Before death and
birth rates reached their minima, the system passed through a period
of considerable population groth, but the characteristics of the
model guaranteed that as aggregate output rose population growth would
not rise as fast, i.e., that per csoita income would rise cumulatively.
Before the system teaches point h, technological progress may have
24. While Figure 2 portrays the process as a "ratchet" effect,
the downward shift of the r function and the rightward shift of the
values may be expected to be continuous.
2created new land (new minerals, cheaper ways of extracting them from
low grade deposits, plastics, new energy sources), thus pushing all or
part of the v function upwards or may have created new substitutes
for labor (labore-saving inventions), thus flattening out the concavity
dounard of the function (raising the right-hand portion of the curve),
and pushing the intersection h to the right. For one or both reasons,
the point h may recede rightward, and rise in per capita income may
continue. This has happened to date in the technologically progres-
sive countries of the world, and the two tendencies show no evidence
of coming to an end or even slowing down.
I suggest that this model, not a Malthusian one, is the appro-
priate model for interpreting the population experience of the world
during its technological progress to date. To make the model of nore
general application, i.e. applicable where there is no technological
progress, we mest incorporate in it the effects of exogenous declines
in death rates. The incorporation is mechanically simple, but to
understand its significance, as well as to delineate clearly the na-
ture of the minimum position of the i function, in Figure 2, it
turns out to be necessary to exarine carefully the nature of the
forces that cause declines in birth rates,.
It would seem at first glance that exogenous declines in death
rates in peasant societies may be shown in Figure I by a vertical rise
of the r curve for some distance from the point y1 , then a turn
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or gradual change of direction to the northeast and continuance to its
maxim level. INovement up the vertical segment represents population
growth due to exogenous reduction in the death rate, and movement
along the rightward sloping segment of the curve represents further
decline induced by rise in per capita income and not possible withoub
it.
However, this representation is not quite correct. For the intro-
duction of improved medical and health measures reduces the subsistence
level of living. It is now possible to subsist, i.e. it is possible
for the population to just reproduce itself, at a lower level of per
capita income. Graohically, in Figure 1 the rate of population growth
rises vertically above the point y I,q and at the same time the r
general 25
curve, retaining its former/shape, slides to the left so that the
new rate of population growth remains on the curve. There is a new
subsistence level of income somewhere to the left of y1.
What happens thereafter depends in part on the precise nature of
the determinants of birth rates. No rise in per capita income has oc-
curred in the sodiety, except in the limited sense indicated in foot*
not6 3. If decline in birth rates results solely from a rise in
25. Of course the slope of the sloping segment may change. With
medical improvements of the sort introduced into low-income societies
in recent years, the horisontal segment of the curve will-also shift
upward, because of a changed age distribution' and because of better
health during child-bearing years, unless the new causes of death men-
tioned in the text appear in time to prevent the shift.
levels of living (a standard-of-living effect in a narrow sense), then
it will not occur unless simultaneously with or soon after the fall in
death ratos, by coincidence there appears technological progress at a
rate sufficient that aggregate income increases at a rate faster than
population, i.e., sufficient to raise the v function far enough so
that its intersection with the r function in its new position is at
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a point to the right of y In many peasant societies which a
have recently experienced exogenous declines in death rates, the rate
of increase in aggregate income required would be more than three per-
cent per year.. In the absence of such a rate, which seems only a re-
mote possibility in the near future in som of those countries, the
intersection of the v and r curves will be to the left of y ,
and per capita income will fall progressively until death rates have
fallen sufficiently, even in the presence of improved public health
and medical measures, to restore equilibrium. Starvation and diseases
associated with malnutrition will replace malaria, venereal disease,
etc., as major causes of death. Social revolution may occur first.
It will not directly effect the birth rate. Of course voluntary con-
trol of birth rates may also occur first.
If the causal force in the decline of birth rates is industriali-
sation and urbanisation, mch the same grim prospect exists. For
26. It is possible to assume that the rise in the rate of popu.
lation growth induces an equal or greater rise in v. The assumption
however seems unrealistic and uninteresting*
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while flight to the cities is occurring, this is not urbanisation in
the conventional sense, and probably will not have a sufficient effect
on the birth rate average far the population as a whole to remectr the
situation sketched here. If, however, another alternative assumption
concerning the causal factors is correct, the prospect is somewhat dif-
ferert. Let me make another set of two assumptions, fully consistent
with the historical facts.
1. Assume that the level of birth rates is determined by that of
death rates. Birth rates are so adjusted to death rates that by in-
tention, at least two children of the typical family grow up to
parenthood. More precisely, since in view of the uncertainties of hu-
man life to rear precisely two children to parenthood is to cut the
probabilities too fine, by intention somewhat more than two are raised
to parenthood. Where death rates are at a level that birth rates can-
not exceed, this intention is of course frustrated. But where condi-
tions of sustenance permit, the basic long-run rate of population
growth is a fairly low positive rate. In equilibrium it does not tend
to rise above that. ("Fairly low" may be taken to refer to a rate
varying among different societies between say .5% and 1.3% per year.f
27. For consistency with the findings of modern social science,
we must assume that this minimum rate is culturally, not biogenically,
determined. Ireland and China may perhaps be taken respectively as ex-
treme cases of low and high tendency to population increase,
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This assumption provides a plausible explanation of the apparent 2 8
tendency of birth rates not to fall until death rates are below them
by at least the indicated differential.
2. This birth rate and size of family calculus is, however, not
primarily conscious and rational, but rather is primarily imbedded
30
in unconscious motives relating to sex and family inculcated in
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children during their earliest years, and reinforced-or altered,
with resulting inner conflict--during adolescence. They relate to
the number of births, the :eath rate being a given fact of the environ-
ment. Since these sex and progeny mores are transmitted unconsciously
by parents (and others), they may change very slowly, and the birth
rate may decline only with a lag of one or several generations after
the death rate declines.
If this is a correct description of the determinants of birth
rates, the so-called standard-of-living effect is not a direct function
28. Available infarmation is not sufficiently accurate for com-
plate certainty.
29. Though, of course, it is rationalized.
30. I use the word *motive" here in its technical psychological
sense, as equivalent to the other technical terms "need," "motivation,"
or (as used by some psychologists) "drive." It does not refer to a
conscious purpose.
31. Perhaps during the "genital" period of the ages three to six
years, when the relationship that Freud termed the "family romance"
appears. Concerning this period, see e.g. 0. S. English and G. H. J.
Pearson, Emotional Problems of Living (New York, 1945). The specula-
tion that this period may be important in the determination of family
size is purely my own.
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of income leiels, but a result of the decline in death rates, which
makes a reoaced birth rate adequate for perpetuation of the family.
We C11 if we wish tentatively specify some aspects of the shape
of the fr iction determining the lag. It may vary inversely afith the
speed a1 conspicuousness of the fall in death rates, and it may have
a minira a length equal to the period from age three to parenthood.
T?,s set of assumptions is consistent with the historical evi-
dance. Unfortunately, however, that evidence provides such meager
clues hat various other assumptions are also consistent with it.
While the set stated above seems to me the most plausible among them,
this judgment is not subject to objective verification.
If this set of hypotheses about the determinants of population
iw -ease is correct, there is somewhat greater hope for avoiding popu-
Is ion catastrophe in the technologically static societies that have
r cently reduced their death rates sharply. Even so, if the minimum
ig between fall in death rates and that in birth rates is a genera-
tion or more, the prospect for a number of countries is unpleasant.3 2
32. Before the "vital revolution" associated with the Industrial
evolution occurred in Western Europe, birth rates there were around
35 per thousand, or almost ten per thousand below present birth rates
,n present peasant societies. Some observers see in this fact a cul-
Mural (or, conceivably, biogenic) difference that bodes ill for the
resent peasant societies. The higher birth rates of present peasant
soieties result in a higher rate of population increase for any given
ovel of death rates. This alone is extremely important. It is also
assible that the higher birth rates may be associated with a greater
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Through economic growth China is apparently escaping this threat. If
economic growth is not achieved in India, a future population explosion
may be very serious. The other countries involved are small
The aladl presented here may or may not be soplicable to the very
long run. A word about the very long run is in order. Even at a rate
of growth of one percent per year, the world's population would double
in 70 years, quadruple in 140, reach a mass equal to that of the earth
in a few thousand yecrs, and so on. But this fact does not seem to me
the cause for alarm that it appears to some observers. In the inter-
vening period, technology may have developed so that subsistence and
energy are obtained from the entire known universe, or several such
universes, and only one man in a thousand may be living on the earth.
Indeed, present trends suggest, if not specifically this, at least
that there is no reason to place any given limit on the creation of
new resources by technology. On the other hand, population functions
may be radically different from those now operating. Hence it seems
reasonable to be more concerned with any of a dozen other world pro-
blems than with that of prospective "standing room only."
resistance of birth rates to following death rates downward. On the
other hand, it is possible that birth rates in Europe during the
Middle Ages, for which we have no data, were also above forty; and
that the halting successive technological improvements of the Middle
Ages had reduced death rates for a sufficient time to cause a fall in
birth rates to about 35, long before the continuing technological im-
provement of the Industrial Revolution initiated further decline. If
so, there is no reason to assume any fundamental difference in beha-
vior between present peasant societies and Western Europe, though of
course variation among individual societies is to be expected.
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IV. POPULATION GRO H IN THE WEST SINCE WORLD WAR II
In presenting the model, it remains to consider whether the rise
in birth rates in Western Europe and the United States after World War
II is consistent with it. Early in the postwar period, birth rates in
most Western %5uropean countries and in the United States rose to a
level not only above those of the depressed 1930's but also well above
those of the 1920's, which had been regarded as the basic rates of
"mature" societies. The phenomenon has now continued so long, and
family sizes have so clearly increased, that at least part of the
development must be regarded as reflecting some secular change.
A possible explanation is to assume that among the satisfactions to
which an increase in income from one generation to the next will be
devoted is that of having a larger number of progeny. A rise in in-
come will therefore tend to cause a rise in the population growth rate
above the basic long-run level via a declining death rate, if the
death rate is in fact declining, and via a rise in the birth rate if
the death rate is stationary and the margin between the two provides
only the basic rate of growth. The effect is a function of the change
33. Crude birth rates sagged slightly during the period 1950-1955
throughout Western Europe, but since this statistical phenomenon would
result merely from the increase in the proportion of children in the
poltin.5, It Is not eortain that age-s'cefic 1drtl retesve fallen
at all, These are not yet available for recent yers. In Englind,
Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, a decline too great to be ac-
counted for in this way had occurred by 195U.
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in incom, not the level of income. The population growth rate tends
to fall back to the basic level if the rise in income comes to an end,
even though the higher level of income persists. Assumption of a lag
of a generation at the turnaround in birth rates would explain the
continuing downward trend of birth rates after death rates in the
early decades of the twentieth century, so that both were at minima
during the 1920's even though incomes were rising.
This explanation is rather forced. It assumes a purely rational
calculation, in addition to the rationalised version of unconscious
motives assumed above. The two assumptions may be psychologically
contradictory. It may be that the recent rise in birth rates results
instead from a more immediate connection between creative energy and
sexual activity, and that the sources--whatever they may be-of the
creative enery which has lifted output rapidly after World War II are
also the sources of the current desire among young parents for larger
families. So far as our uncertain historical knowledge indicates,
this latter hypothesis is consistent with the behavior of population
during early periods of industrialization. On the other hand, it can
be fitted to the facts of the 1920's only with some difficulty.
One may therefore have to resort to saing simply that the rise in
birth rates after World War II constitutes a shift in the population
function, resulting perhaps from the successive stresses of depression,
war, and postwar tensions. Whatever the true reason for the post,
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World-WWr-II rise in the birth rate may be, any very penetrating ex-
planation of it will undoubtedly have to wait urstil the theory of perm
sonality formation has advanced beyond its present state. But none of
the hypotheses that suggest themselves now are Inconsistent with those
presented above relating to other aspects of population growth.
A model embodying the assumptions presented in this section, in.
cluding the first alternative in paragraph 4, is suggested in a mathe-
matical appendiz.
V. THE MALTHUSIAN MODEL
The reader, if he has a Malthusian model in mind, will have ob-
served that the model presented here differs from it in various par-
ticulars. This is obvious even though Malthus' presentation in
successive issues of the Essa and in the Sulement to the Fifth
Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica varies sufficiently in speoi-f
fics and is sufficiently lacking in rigor so that it is difficult to
reach an agreed-on simple statement of the model. But perhaps the
following five points, either because of explicit statement by Malthus
or by the requirements of the model, may be regarded as essential
points.
1. The birth rate is not influenced by the level of income, and
implicitly not by death rates. As a result, a decline in the death
V.
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rate simply increases the rate of population increase. (Malthus does
not make clear the role of birth and death rate! respectively in popu-
lation Increase. The first sentence in this paragraph is an extension
of his position rather than a simple statement of it. He asserts simply
that people tend to have as large families as they can provide sub-
sistence for.)
2. Land is augmentable only at increasing cost.
3. A law of variable proportions operates.
4. Some sort of restriction on capital accumulation operates,
so that capital accumulation cannot offset the limitation on quantity
of land sufficiently to prevent per capita income from falling as
population rises.
5. Technology is constant--or, technological progress is not re-
lated in any causal way to population growth, but if it occurs is only
a coincidental development that may for a time stave off the results
of diminishing returns.
The initial statement of a model associated with Figure 1 incor-
porates these assumptions, with the exception that a neo-Malthusian
standard-of-living effect at a fairly high level of income is posited.
It follows, as it does from any rigorous formulation of a Malthusian
model, that if some force (not explained by the model) causes growth
in aggregate income, it can (in the absence of moral self-restraint
concerning procreation) increase per capita income much above subsis-
tence only if the rate of growth in tggregate income exceeds the maximum
possible rate of population growth. The unrealistic assumptions would
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not be objectionable if they resulted in an analysis that satisfac-
torily explained reality. But the conclusion just stated contradicts
the central facts of population history.
Important Malthusian strains have persisted in our thinking and
in university teaching. I suspect that they have persisted largely
because the model predicts population growth, population growth has
occurred, and we have not had a satisfactory alternative explanation.
It is of course important to retain the simple notion that rise of
income above subsistonce tends to result in population growth. But
we need .to analyze that growth by tools more relevant than the Mal-
thusian ones. Even if the model presented here should prove unsatis.
factory, the contradiction between Malthusian analysis and the facts
of pdpulation history suggests that the Malthusian model is an imped-.
iment, not an aid, to our thinking about population.
Algebraic Appendix
The model which has been outlined in Sections III and IV may be
described algebraically as follows:
D = D(yt. )(1
D * 10
where D = the-ratio of deaths per year to total population
y = per capita income
t w the time period, measured in units of generations,
n * a time interval measured in the same units, and
M a the state of medical practice in the country, e.g. as
evaluated on an index by a world board of medical exainers.
B B + (2)tt
BO B (Dt, Dt., .. D ) (3)
t
B - D )(h)Lt4-
where B = the ratio of births per year to total population during
the generation t.'
B depends on the death rate in the previous generation and on the
rate of change in the death rate during the previous a generstions; and
the component which is related to increase in income, depends on
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the rate of population growth not so related in the previous genera.-
tion, and on the rate of increase in per capita income between the
previous generation end the present one. The max notation indicates
that there is a maximum to the increase-in-income effect,
PtaBt - D (5)
where P the ratio of increase in population per year to total
population.
The shape of the several functions may be indicated more specifi-
cally as follows:
Dt = D (ytg, M) (la)
Bj k + D,3 - t(Dt.., - D - ft (D l - (Dt., 3 -\) (3a)
where k I t, a positive constant, if yt ys + E
kI fyt, if y < ye + E
< (& ( Ill, and I + It + (approx.) 1.
Bi rq 4W(Bj,, - Dt4).Er 4~:~ )J7 (4a)
where 14 +k '!O q Or r, whichever is the greater, and where the term
K.1 - .Dt) is limited to the domain between sero and q inclusive,
and the term in the second set of brackets to a domain having a maxi
mum value of unity. In equations (3a) and (4a), ., 1', i", q, and r
are positive constants, and y the subsistence level of per capita
income.
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is the "basic" rate of population increase. In equilibrium,
the birth rate will in general exceed the death rate by this amount.
However, if y is at the subsistence level, k becomes zero, and below
the subsistence level, becomes negative. If the death rate declined
during generation t-l or t-2, the excess of the birth rate over the
death rate will be greater than k. However, the effect of a death
rate decline in generation t-3 is virtually fully reflected in the
birth rate by generation t. If there has been no subsequent fall in
the death rate, Dt-2 a D = D, and, since I + k, + t" e (approx.) 1,
equation (3a) becomes: Bi - k + Dt
In equation (ha), since Bt is a product of the two terms in
brackets, it is zero if either is zero. The term in the first set of
brackets indicates that the change-in-income effect on P does not add
to other factors to cause population increase above a maximum q. The
term in the second set of brackets indicates that if per capita income
is identical -with that of the previous generation, there is zero ef-
fet. If yt > yt.., the change-in-income effect is of course negative,
To assume that r remains constant if y declines is of course a heroic
simplification.
All of the parameters, being culturally determined, vary among
societies.
